Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Cruz-Guzman What Does it Mean (1)

Back in the fall of 2017, I wrote a series of articles on the Cruz-Guzman and Forslund litigations.   At that time, I was pretty critical of the tactics followed by the lawyers on both sides. The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs used the "Education Clause" of our constitution in an effort to require the state to unwind the growing racial isolation of many of our urban schools. Our Education Clause requires the legislature to create a uniform, general thorough and efficient system of public education, and they asserted that the consequence of racial isolation was to impair that adequate education.  

My criticism of the plaintiffs position centered upon their failure to point to the legislative framework that defines an adequate education.    I worried that by failing to mine the rich set of laws which tell us what modern public school students must learn, they were leaving the courts untethered from the statutory framework.   I was worried that the Judges would be reluctant to define an adequate education without guidance from the legislature, and that by failing to connect the Cruz-Guzman claims to that legislative framework, the plaintiffs were risking a finding that their claims were "not justiciable,"  that is, not enforceable in the courts.   As it turned out the worry was justified, but as of today, the Constitutional Education Clause has been preserved by the Supreme Court's decision.

In response to the Cruz-Guzman Complaint, the State of Minnesota, Commissioner Cassellius and  Governor Dayton, represented by Attorney General Swanson, defended the Cruz Guzman complaint by arguing that the state's Constitutional Education Clause was legally unenforceable!!!.  They made this claim right into the teeth of the Supreme Court's own prior Skeen decision,  which had already held that the Education Clause not only created a right, but an elevated form of right, as important as freedom of speech, or racial equal protection of the law.   So, as I criticized both sides, I heaped special abuse on the State constitutional officers who seemed to be sacrificing a constitutional right for a temporary legal victory.    See "Constitutional Officers Should Protect and Defend the Constitution" in Cruz-Guzman.   I also heaped some abuse on the Court of Appeals for buying into the State's defense, which I thought was pretty off the wall.  See "Cruz Guzman Court of Appeals Decision" Mangles the Constitutional Education Clause, and Appellate Court Mangles the Law in Cruz Guzman Decision Part 2.

To the plaintiffs lawyers the Shulmans, I apologize.  You took a big risk with the strategy that you followed, and came up big!   Congratulation on a great victory.  The Constitutional Education Clause was at the brink of destruction, and the Supreme Court brought it back from the brink and made it stronger.

Almost everyone who reads the media coverage will likely understand the Cruz-Guzman case as a school desegregation case, but it is much more than that.  The State's defense and the Court of Appeals terrible decision put the entirety of Minnesota's Constitutional Education Clause at risk, making it enforceable only at the discretion of the legislature.  As I wrote last September: 

basically the state was asking the  Supreme Court to hold that enforcement of the state constitutional education clause in this particular case could not be decided by the courts, but was a matter entirely between the legislature and he voters at the polls.

Suppose for example, the legislature passed a law prohibiting citizens from saying prayers in the public square.    The First Amendment certainly protects that right, but if a Court wanted to avoid protecting that right, it could claim that the authors of the Constitution didn't want the Courts to protect First Amendment rights, since the First Amendment simply says that the Congress shall make no law ....prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].  Now, you would say, that is ridiculous:   the constitution uses the word "shall."  Surely the authors of the constitution intended that citizens could prevent the Congress from making a law that directly contradicts the first amendment, and of course you would be right.   Free speech is a fundamental right:  and if the Congress acted to prohibit its free exercise, the Courts would certainly step in and protect citizens against that law.
So, when the Court of Appeals said that an education clause claim is not justiciable, it was pretty shocking.   This clause was placed in our constitution with the support of Republicans and Democrats who founded our state's constitution.   These founders believed that an adequate public education was central to our democracy.   They felt that an uneducated population could not properly make civic decisions, and hence they wanted to require maintenance of a "thorough and efficient" system of public education, even if the legislature wanted to dispense with paying for one. 

As the Supreme Court pointed out, in the past cases, old and new, where the Education Clause has been at issue, the Court has always held that the clause provides an important justiciable right.  Justice Hudson explained:
Although specific determinations of educational policy are matters for the Legislature, it does not follow that the judiciary cannot adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional duty under the Education Clause. Deciding that appellants’ claims are not justiciable would effectively hold that the judiciary cannot rule on the Legislature’s noncompliance with a constitutional mandate, which would leave Education Clause claims without a remedy. Such a result is incompatible with the principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy.

....although the constitution assigns to the Legislature the duty of establishing “a general and uniform system of public schools,” Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1, the interpretation of the constitution’s language “is a judicial, not a legislative, question,” Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Minn. 2012). See also Rhodes v. Walsh, 57 N.W. 212, 213 (Minn. 1893) (explaining that “the meaning or interpretation of a constitutional provision . . . is for the judiciary to determine
That's a lot of material to digest in a single sitting.  In a nutshell, the Supreme Court has allowed the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs to go back to the District Court and prove their claims, because their claims are justiciable.  That is to say, they have a right to seek relief from the Courts.   Whether they can prove their claim is another matter, and I'll save that for later posts on this important case. 

Past Series on Education and Constitutional law:

McCleary v. State, Part I   McCleary v State Requires Legislature to Base Funding on Actual Cost
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part II
McCleary v State and Determining the Cost of Education
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part III
 McCleary v. State: what level of scrutiny is appropriate for legislative funding decisions
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part IV
Correlating the cost of education: fund the child.
Jvonkorff on Education  McCleary V. State Part V
Summary of Decision Network for Excellence
Washington Supreme Court Blog  
JvonKorff on Education, The Rose Decision 
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part I
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part II
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part III
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part IV
Minnesota Constitutional Challenge to Tenure Misses the Mark (Forslund)
Forslund suit insufficiently ambitious
Vergara Decision Raises Questions about Minnesota Anti-Tenure Suit
Three Branches of Government are Responsible to Provide a Minnesota Adequate Education
What Does Adequate Education Mean and Who Decides
Commissioner Cassellius Throws Sand in the Face of the Courts to Win the Cruz-Guzman Litigation Academic Standards Law is Part of Minnesota Adequate Education Framework
What is an Adequate Education under Minnesota Law (Part I)

Minnesotas Adequate Education Laws--Special Education
Curriculum Content Standards Help Define a Minnesota Adequate Education(Part 4)

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