Friday, July 27, 2018

Cruz Guzman--What does it Mean Part 3

As I talk to friends and colleagues about the Cruz-Guzman case and the Supreme Court's decision, the most common question I get focuses on the relationship between Brown versus Board of Education, the federal constitutional suit, and this new Cruz-Guzman suit.   In a nutshell, Brown v. Board of Education relies on the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.   Cruz-Guzman relies instead on the Minnesota constitution as a hook to try to attack racially isolated public schools.   "I thought that was taken care of by Brown," people say.   So this post is going to wade in to that question at a surface level.  The topic is legally, sociologically, and educationally more complex than a few blog posts can do justice to.  

The cause of racially isolated schools in the Twin Cities is complex.   One theory is the urban "death spiral" theory that works this way:  as a school or district experiences a larger and larger enrollment of lower income or other students with statistically lower educational performance, the school becomes less attractive.  The parents in the neighborhood have less and less political power.   Realtors steer families away from the neighborhood.  More and more students who need higher cost programs to thrive create financial pressures, and the school starts to decline in perception, and that accelerates the decline.   Teachers avoid the school and use their seniority to transfer to other schools, or migrate to other districts, and that cycle feeds on itself.   In a charter school environment, some parents transfer to an attractive charter school, leaving less motivated parents behind.  

One way to combat this downward spiral would be somehow to force students and families back into the school, against their will.   Another way to combat this downward spiral would be to rebuild the school's reputation with better leaders, more resources, better curriculum, and a spirit of high expectations.  The downward spiral is fed in part by perception and in part by reality. 

Another theory of racial isolation is propounded by the godfather of racial isolation theory in Minnesota, Myron Orfield.  If you want to understand how housing, education, and governmental policy interface, take a look at the Orfield Stancil article in the William Mitchell Law Review, which you can read on the web here:  Why are the Twin Cities so Segregated.?  Orfield and Stancil argue that the twin cities has formed a "Poverty Education Complex" (PEC) that is reinforced by the Poverty Housing Industry (PHI) each of which fosters policies that make segregation worse.   "As a result of segregation," the argue, "city schools declined,

which gave momentum to a “school choice”movement that sought to implement free-market ideas in the education system. These so-called “education reformers” would become the PEC.Its policies have increased and preserved thegrowth of educational segregation.
Now, you don't need to buy into this theory, to be concerned about racial isolation.   There is a learning value to going to school with persons who have a different life story and a different life perspective.   But at the core of the Cruz-Guzman claims is the assertion that racially isolated schools causes subpar educational performance.  In fact, the claim is that a racially isolated school is per se unconstitutionally inadequate, and evidently, even if the students at that school are doing well. 

How might that be true?:  one view, which I do not share, is that when black students sit in chairs next to white students, they learn better.  Another view is that we live an a white privileged society, or a economic privileged society,  one which operates to deprive schools attended predominantly by low income and black students from the best teachers, the best principals, a quality curriculum, and the motivating force of high standards and high expectations.   (If this is true, one might ask, is the solution to move kids to white dominated schools, or to bring a constitutional litigation  to force Minnesota to stock these racially isolated schools with high quality leaders and a strong curriculum).  

We are zoning in now, on an important question: Why have the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs equated racial isolation with constitutional inadequacy--- why not attack it with the Brown v Board of Education theory.  Part of the answer is the growing difficulty of convincing a federal court to find the kind of segregation that is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.  We'll come back to that after we take a look at the Cruz-Guzman allegations. 

The Cruz-Guzman complaint contains a series of detailed allegations regarding the two cities racially isolated schools and their impact.  For example:
The Minneapolis and Saint Paul Public Schools have been in the past and currently are segregated on the basis of both race and socioeconomic status, such that plaintiffs and other school-age children attend schools the enrollment of which is disproportionately comprised of students of color and students living in poverty, as compared with a number of neighboring and surrounding schools and districts. The plaintiffs are therefore confined to schools that are separate and segregated in terms of both racial and socioeconomic composition.
The Complaint alleges that racially and economically isolated schools are unequal, no matter how the come to be racially isolated.
As a matter of both law and fact, such schools are not equal to neighboring and surrounding whiter and more affluent suburban schools. Because such schools are separate and unequal, the education the students receive is per se inadequate within the meaning of the Education Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
"Schools within Minnesota concentrate students by poverty and race," the Complaint continues. "These students so concentrated in certain Minneapolis and Saint Paul schools are capable of learning and performing at an adequate educational level, as measured by widely accepted standards. The educational environment in which they are placed, however, with the high degree of segregation based on race and socioeconomic status and the negative effects incident thereto, depresses their educational opportunities and achievement."
With the knowledge and consent of the defendants, [the Governor, Commissioner and State legislature] the Minneapolis public school district has also established and permitted the formation of numerous hyper-segregated schools, in which children of color and/or children receiving free or reduced lunch constitute close to or more than 80 percent of the enrollment
The existence of segregation causes students education to be inadequate, the Complaint alleges.
The segregation and hyper-segregation described in the foregoing tables have been the result of boundary decisions by the Minneapolis and Saint Paul School Districts, made with the knowledge and consent of defendants (the State), which have had both the purpose and effect of creating and increasing segregation of the Minneapolis and Saint Paul public schools by race and socioeconomic status.
Now let's return to this question, how does it happen that Cruz-Guzman had to go to state  court to integrate racially unbalanced schools more than 50 years after  the United States Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public education was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.  Wait a minute, you say, I thought that the school integration issue was resolved back in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education.   And that would certainly be correct, but Brown v. Board of Education dealt with what we lawyers call "de jure" segregation, that is segregation by law.
 
In each of the cases considered by the Supreme Court in Brown, as the court explained:
  "minors of the Negro race,had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race."
The plaintiff children's schools in Brown refused to admit them, because of their race, even though they lived geographically in the attendance area for the school to which they were denied admission.   The Supreme Court recognized that using the law to deny children admission to a school because of their race, was a public statement alleging that they are inferior.  "To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race," the court stated,  "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."  The Court continued:
The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Brown v. Board of Education found that when the state or its instrumentalities use the law to separate the races, or keep kids from enrolling in a school based on race, that this is a violation of the 14th amendments "equal protection clause", which states:
No state shall ….deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws
Thus, the fact that segregation was enforced by law had really two influences on the Brown court.   First, the Court found that separation of the races using the force of law was inherently unequal, because of the impact it had on children who were being intentionally separated.  Second, state action was required in order to trigger the fourteenth amendment, under the language of that amendment.    If a private school segregates, there is no state action, and so that would not be actionable under the fourteenth amendment.   (That's why state and federal laws have been enacted to bar racial discrimination in commerce: to remedy racial segregation in the private sphere.) 

But to fall under the 14th amendment, state action is required.  As the law of Brown v Board of Education developed, federal courts refused to apply the Brown decision to schools that are racially isolated, but not as a result of the action of the state or its instrumentalities.  And that is one of the challenges faced by the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs and their lawyers.  They must have felt that they could not convince the current federal court hierarchy that racial isolation in Minneapolis was truly the product of state action of a kind that the federal courts regard as invidious.   And, they may have felt that the kinds of remedies available in federal court would not be sufficient. 

This entire area is a mine field of difficulties.   There are many who believe that integrated schools are critical to prepare students for the diverse society in which we live, and that racially isolated schools deprive students of the experience they will need as America becomes ever more diverse.  But there are also advocates who believe that racially isolated schools necessarily result in poor educational results.  But there are even barriers to voluntarily moving kids from school to school in order to promote racial balance. 

In Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) the United States Supreme Court struck down a voluntary diversity school enrollment program because it granted racial preferences when necessary to diversify enrollment. This and other federal cases has discouraged civil rights lawyers from using the federal courts to attack racially isolated schools.   Faced with increasing hostility to desegregation suits in the federal courts, civil rights lawyers  began to look for hooks to attack racially isolated schools based on state causes of actions. 

The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs decided to attack racial isolation under the state constitution, arguing instead that racially isolated schools deny students equal protection of the laws under Minnesota's uniformity clause, and arguing as well, that students in racially isolated schools were receiving an inadequate education as a direct result of the racial isolation itself. 

This is how Cruz-Guzman arrived in the Supreme Court.  The court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs claim for relief based upon inadequate education entirely.   Basically, the Court of Appeals said, adequate education is entirely a legislative matter: the courts have nothing to do with it.   It wouldn't have mattered under the court of appeals decision if the plaintiffs had said that our students were getting an inadequate education because of poor funding, or poor teaching, or unconscionably low expectations.  As it arrived in the Supreme  Court, the case had been dismissed simply because a panel of three judges had said the right to an adequate education is simply none of our business.

Now that the Supreme Court has rejected this remarkable thesis, we still have a question in Minnesota:  does it make sense to try to connect racial isolation alone to inadequate education, or do we need to look at something more ambitious?  We'll visit that question in future posts.



Thursday, July 26, 2018

Cruse-Guzman What Does it Mean (2)

I've begun a series to discuss the implication of the Supreme Court's new Cruz-Guzman decision In the first post, I explained that the the Cruz Guzman plaintiffs brought a suit claiming that their attendance at racially isolated schools deprived them of an adequate education, but that the Court of Appeals had decided that the right to an adequate education was unenforcible.

I cannot do justice to this topic in a few paragraphs.   Its going to take more and longer posts. But, we in the education community have been handed a great opportunity by the Cruz-Guzman decision to fix our broken public education system.  We cannot afford to squander that opportunity by thinking small.   There have now been three major constitutional litigations brought to  reform education some way since 1990.  The first, Skeen v State, sought to give smaller mostly white districts a fairer property tax system.   The recent Forslund suit sought to attack the seniority system and challenge tenure.   This Cruz-Guzman attacks racially isolated schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul.

Listen!  The Minneapolis school district is being crushed financially.   The students in the plaintiff class, if they are still attending Minneapolis schools, are witnessing cutbacks.  Their school district's special education funding shortfall  is over $50 million and will continue to rise.   In the next couple of weeks, the Mitchell Hamline Law Review will publish my law review article: Minnesota’s Education System Is Unconstitutional Will Someone Bring a Compelling Case?  That article argues that we must attack our unconstitutional education system more thoughtfully, more intentionally,  with "the end in mind."    Minnesota's public education system is too deeply broken to fix it with one simplistic solution.   Charter schools didn't do it.  Bussing didn't do it.   Culturally responsive teaching didn't do it.  And an injunction banning racial isolation, while certainly a step forward, will not get us where we need to be.

We need to stop trying to find simple solutions that ignore the growing research that looks at systems, that recognizes that public education is  complex, and that it takes all hands on deck to transform it. 

So in these coming posts, I'll be trying to provide some background to post readers that answer a few questions:
  • Why the heck are the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs suing the state using the Minnesota Education Clause about desegregation?  Didn't that get fixed by Brown v. Board of Education?
  • What are the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs complaining about?  Who is responsible for racial isolation; how would it get "fixed"; and will fixing it really give us the through, efficient, and adequate public education system that the constitution requires?
  • Why has nobody brought a suit to challenge the massive underfunding of Minnesota's public education system?  These suits have been brought across the country, but in Minnesota, nobody has stepped forward?  Is that because the education community thinks that Minnesota's funding is, well, pretty darn good, and we don't want to rock the boat?  Or, is it because too many people in the education community are afraid that a financial adequacy litigation would help other schools and other districts more?  Or is it a by product of the forces in Minnesota who don't really want more funding for the districts who need it?
  • What would a really comprehensive, ambitious constitutional litigation look like, and why is nobody bringing it?
  • How can we bring the education community together, charters, the big two metro school district, the AMSD suburban school districts and outstate districts, to advocate for a big comprehensive fix.  How can we get the community to stop looking out for themselves, and start fighting the big fight, for a truly adequate truly constitutional system
If there's anyone out  there who is interested in making a contribution to this dialog, chime in.   More to come......
Past Series on Education and Constitutional law:

McCleary v. State, Part I   McCleary v State Requires Legislature to Base Funding on Actual Cost
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part II
McCleary v State and Determining the Cost of Education
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part III
 McCleary v. State: what level of scrutiny is appropriate for legislative funding decisions
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part IV
Correlating the cost of education: fund the child.
Jvonkorff on Education  McCleary V. State Part V
Summary of Decision Network for Excellence
Washington Supreme Court Blog  
JvonKorff on Education, The Rose Decision 
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part I
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part II
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part III
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part IV
Minnesota Constitutional Challenge to Tenure Misses the Mark (Forslund)
Forslund suit insufficiently ambitious
Vergara Decision Raises Questions about Minnesota Anti-Tenure Suit
Three Branches of Government are Responsible to Provide a Minnesota Adequate Education
What Does Adequate Education Mean and Who Decides
Commissioner Cassellius Throws Sand in the Face of the Courts to Win the Cruz-Guzman Litigation Academic Standards Law is Part of Minnesota Adequate Education Framework
What is an Adequate Education under Minnesota Law (Part I)

Minnesotas Adequate Education Laws--Special Education
Curriculum Content Standards Help Define a Minnesota Adequate Education(Part 4)



 
 

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Cruz-Guzman What Does it Mean (1)

Back in the fall of 2017, I wrote a series of articles on the Cruz-Guzman and Forslund litigations.   At that time, I was pretty critical of the tactics followed by the lawyers on both sides. The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs used the "Education Clause" of our constitution in an effort to require the state to unwind the growing racial isolation of many of our urban schools. Our Education Clause requires the legislature to create a uniform, general thorough and efficient system of public education, and they asserted that the consequence of racial isolation was to impair that adequate education.  

My criticism of the plaintiffs position centered upon their failure to point to the legislative framework that defines an adequate education.    I worried that by failing to mine the rich set of laws which tell us what modern public school students must learn, they were leaving the courts untethered from the statutory framework.   I was worried that the Judges would be reluctant to define an adequate education without guidance from the legislature, and that by failing to connect the Cruz-Guzman claims to that legislative framework, the plaintiffs were risking a finding that their claims were "not justiciable,"  that is, not enforceable in the courts.   As it turned out the worry was justified, but as of today, the Constitutional Education Clause has been preserved by the Supreme Court's decision.

In response to the Cruz-Guzman Complaint, the State of Minnesota, Commissioner Cassellius and  Governor Dayton, represented by Attorney General Swanson, defended the Cruz Guzman complaint by arguing that the state's Constitutional Education Clause was legally unenforceable!!!.  They made this claim right into the teeth of the Supreme Court's own prior Skeen decision,  which had already held that the Education Clause not only created a right, but an elevated form of right, as important as freedom of speech, or racial equal protection of the law.   So, as I criticized both sides, I heaped special abuse on the State constitutional officers who seemed to be sacrificing a constitutional right for a temporary legal victory.    See "Constitutional Officers Should Protect and Defend the Constitution" in Cruz-Guzman.   I also heaped some abuse on the Court of Appeals for buying into the State's defense, which I thought was pretty off the wall.  See "Cruz Guzman Court of Appeals Decision" Mangles the Constitutional Education Clause, and Appellate Court Mangles the Law in Cruz Guzman Decision Part 2.

To the plaintiffs lawyers the Shulmans, I apologize.  You took a big risk with the strategy that you followed, and came up big!   Congratulation on a great victory.  The Constitutional Education Clause was at the brink of destruction, and the Supreme Court brought it back from the brink and made it stronger.

Almost everyone who reads the media coverage will likely understand the Cruz-Guzman case as a school desegregation case, but it is much more than that.  The State's defense and the Court of Appeals terrible decision put the entirety of Minnesota's Constitutional Education Clause at risk, making it enforceable only at the discretion of the legislature.  As I wrote last September: 

basically the state was asking the  Supreme Court to hold that enforcement of the state constitutional education clause in this particular case could not be decided by the courts, but was a matter entirely between the legislature and he voters at the polls.

Suppose for example, the legislature passed a law prohibiting citizens from saying prayers in the public square.    The First Amendment certainly protects that right, but if a Court wanted to avoid protecting that right, it could claim that the authors of the Constitution didn't want the Courts to protect First Amendment rights, since the First Amendment simply says that the Congress shall make no law ....prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].  Now, you would say, that is ridiculous:   the constitution uses the word "shall."  Surely the authors of the constitution intended that citizens could prevent the Congress from making a law that directly contradicts the first amendment, and of course you would be right.   Free speech is a fundamental right:  and if the Congress acted to prohibit its free exercise, the Courts would certainly step in and protect citizens against that law.
So, when the Court of Appeals said that an education clause claim is not justiciable, it was pretty shocking.   This clause was placed in our constitution with the support of Republicans and Democrats who founded our state's constitution.   These founders believed that an adequate public education was central to our democracy.   They felt that an uneducated population could not properly make civic decisions, and hence they wanted to require maintenance of a "thorough and efficient" system of public education, even if the legislature wanted to dispense with paying for one. 

As the Supreme Court pointed out, in the past cases, old and new, where the Education Clause has been at issue, the Court has always held that the clause provides an important justiciable right.  Justice Hudson explained:
Although specific determinations of educational policy are matters for the Legislature, it does not follow that the judiciary cannot adjudicate whether the Legislature has satisfied its constitutional duty under the Education Clause. Deciding that appellants’ claims are not justiciable would effectively hold that the judiciary cannot rule on the Legislature’s noncompliance with a constitutional mandate, which would leave Education Clause claims without a remedy. Such a result is incompatible with the principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy.

....although the constitution assigns to the Legislature the duty of establishing “a general and uniform system of public schools,” Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1, the interpretation of the constitution’s language “is a judicial, not a legislative, question,” Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Minn. 2012). See also Rhodes v. Walsh, 57 N.W. 212, 213 (Minn. 1893) (explaining that “the meaning or interpretation of a constitutional provision . . . is for the judiciary to determine
That's a lot of material to digest in a single sitting.  In a nutshell, the Supreme Court has allowed the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs to go back to the District Court and prove their claims, because their claims are justiciable.  That is to say, they have a right to seek relief from the Courts.   Whether they can prove their claim is another matter, and I'll save that for later posts on this important case. 

Past Series on Education and Constitutional law:

McCleary v. State, Part I   McCleary v State Requires Legislature to Base Funding on Actual Cost
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part II
McCleary v State and Determining the Cost of Education
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part III
 McCleary v. State: what level of scrutiny is appropriate for legislative funding decisions
Jvonkorff on Education McCleary v. State, Part IV
Correlating the cost of education: fund the child.
Jvonkorff on Education  McCleary V. State Part V
Summary of Decision Network for Excellence
Washington Supreme Court Blog  
JvonKorff on Education, The Rose Decision 
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part I
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part II
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part III
Minnesota's School Finance System is Unconstitutional, Part IV
Minnesota Constitutional Challenge to Tenure Misses the Mark (Forslund)
Forslund suit insufficiently ambitious
Vergara Decision Raises Questions about Minnesota Anti-Tenure Suit
Three Branches of Government are Responsible to Provide a Minnesota Adequate Education
What Does Adequate Education Mean and Who Decides
Commissioner Cassellius Throws Sand in the Face of the Courts to Win the Cruz-Guzman Litigation Academic Standards Law is Part of Minnesota Adequate Education Framework
What is an Adequate Education under Minnesota Law (Part I)

Minnesotas Adequate Education Laws--Special Education
Curriculum Content Standards Help Define a Minnesota Adequate Education(Part 4)

Supreme Court's Second Cruz-Guzman Decision Requires Fundamental Re-Evaluation of Education Clause Claims

The Minnesota Supreme Court's recent Cruz-Guzman decision has radically, (but appropriately), refocused Minnesota's jurisprudence on...