Monday, November 16, 2026

What Minnesota Can Learn from a High Performing School




In our last post, we promised to take a close look at a school with a demonstrated record of success with lower-income students, English language learners and students of color. The school is Brooke Charter Schools, a network of public charter schools in Boston. I chose to highlight Brooke because it:

  1. Persistently produces outstanding results.
  2. Provides its students with about 30 percent more learning time than a typical Minnesota district such as St. Cloud, the equivalent of about 52 more school days a year.
  3. Makes an unparalleled investment in recruiting and continually developing its teachers, supported by peer observations, co-planning and data meetings focused on what students need.

1. Persistent results in a state that sets the bar high

Brooke serves about 2,200 students in grades K-12. More than ninety percent are Black and/or Latinx, drawn mainly from Dorchester, Mattapan, Hyde Park, East Boston, Roxbury and Chelsea. In its 2019-20 annual report, Brooke reported that the average annual income of its families was $38,000. Admission is by random lottery, open to all Boston and Chelsea students, including English learners and students with disabilities.

Before looking at results, a word about the measuring stick. "Proficient" in Massachusetts does not mean the same thing as "proficient" in Minnesota. The National Center for Education Statistics regularly maps each state's proficiency standard onto the scale of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the common national yardstick. In the 2024 preliminary mapping, Massachusetts' proficiency standard matched NAEP Proficient in reading and math in both grade 4 and grade 8. Minnesota's standard mapped to NAEP Basic in all four. Massachusetts has been at or near the top of these rankings for nearly twenty years. A Brooke student who scores proficient on the Massachusetts MCAS has cleared a higher bar than a Minnesota student who scores proficient on the MCA.

Against that high bar, Brooke reports:

  • Brooke is in the top five in Massachusetts for student growth in both English and math, grades 3-8 (2024 MCAS).
  • More Black students exceed expectations than in all of the other Boston Public Schools, grades 3-8 combined (2024 MCAS).
  • It was designated as a Massachusetts School of Recognition in 2025.
  • It is one of the top two open-enrollment high schools in Boston, and the only Massachusetts school in which every member of the class of 2020 scored advanced or proficient on the high school MCAS.

Brooke's English learners also progress unusually fast. In the state's 2026 accountability report, Brooke's English learners and former English learners in grades 3-8 posted the strongest math growth of any student group in the school. And Brooke's reading scores keep pace with its math scores: "Our kids do well on tests because they love reading."

The results have also lasted. When then-state Commissioner Mitchell Chester supported Brooke's expansion into high school, he said it would be hard to overstate Brooke's track record. Brooke's first graduating class, in 2020, sent 89 percent of its seniors to college, with acceptances at 112 different colleges.

There are some caveats:

  • The pandemic hurt Brooke too. Its statewide percentile fell from the 92nd to the 81st in math, and from the 87th to the 81st in English, between 2019 and 2022. Brooke's students, however, are still performing in the top fifth of the state.
  • Families choose to apply. Admission is by lottery, but only applicants enter it.
  • Brooke's student population differs somewhat from the Boston Public Schools. According to the state, about 10.6 percent of Brooke's students are English learners, 16.5 percent are students with disabilities, and 61.2 percent are low income.

But the state's growth data accounts for student differences. Massachusetts measures each student's growth against students across the state who started with similar test scores. In 2026, Brooke's students in grades 3-8 grew faster than typical in both reading and math, and so did its English learners and its students with disabilities. Brooke's English learners posted the strongest math growth of any group in the school. Compared with high-needs students in similar schools statewide, Brooke's high-needs students ranked in the 96th percentile.  



2. More time to learn: 30 percent more than St. Cloud and other Minnesota public schools

If a student arrives a year or more behind, as many do, what makes us think he can catch up with more advantaged classmates in the same amount of time? To be frank, in Minnesota this is a topic we refuse even to consider: in essence, our answer is based on convenience for adults, not for the students who are behind.

Brooke's answer is to give students significantly more learning time. Brooke's K-8 students start at 7:45 a.m. and are dismissed at 4:00 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. On Wednesdays they are dismissed at 12:20 p.m. so teachers can spend the afternoon on professional development and collaboration. Brooke East Boston's 2026-27 calendar runs from August 12, 2026 to June 17, 2027: 191 school days for grades 1-8.

Using my own district as a Minnesota example, here is how that compares with St. Cloud's elementary schools:



Note what Brooke does with its Wednesdays. It gives up 37 student afternoons a year so teachers can work together, and it still provides far more student time than St. Cloud does.

3. Great teachers are made, not born

Brooke's philosophy starts from a simple premise: teaching is an intellectual profession, and great teachers are developed throughout their careers, not discovered. There is no presumption that a teaching degree alone produces great teaching. Brooke builds its own pipeline through its Associate Teacher Program, a year-long, school-based residency founded in 2006:

  • Associates are paid a full $60,000 salary with benefits during their training year.
  • They begin with a full month of professional development, then attend weekly seminars throughout the year.
  • Each Associate has an experienced teacher-coach who observes, mentors and evaluates them monthly.
  • They gain classroom experience by teaching parts of lessons and covering classes, taking on more responsibility as they grow.

The program is also designed to diversify the teaching workforce, and it works: about 30 percent of Brooke's current staff began as Associates, including at least one current principal. Hiring itself is rigorous. Candidates go through a phone screen, a panel interview with current teachers, and an in-person demonstration lesson with students. All new teachers, not just Associates, get a month of training before their first school year.

4. Teachers learning from teachers: observation and collaboration

Brooke's support does not end after the first year. Every teacher, novice or veteran, receives:

  • At least 20 observations a year by principals and assistant principals, each followed by prompt feedback. Compare that with Minnesota, where state law requires only one formal evaluation of an experienced teacher every three years. National surveys find that most teachers receive observation feedback about once a year, and more than four in ten never observe a colleague's classroom in a typical month (RAND American Teacher Panel).
  • Peer observations and video analysis of their own teaching.
  • About three hours of professional development and collaboration every Wednesday afternoon.
  • Regular co-planning with same-grade colleagues, and data meetings to review student progress and adjust instruction.


Brooke also made a structural choice that supports all this collaboration. Its middle grades are organized like an elementary school: students stay with the same teacher for most of the day in self-contained classrooms. Administrator Steadman pushed for the change after noticing that Brooke's elementary teachers, who planned together by grade level, were more satisfied than middle school subject specialists. The model gives every grade a team of teachers planning the same lessons together. It also means students are known well by the adults who teach them. Brooke founder Jon Clark has said that if you asked Brooke teachers what most pushes them to get better, they would name having a smart colleague to plan with and to study data with.

In my first post in this series, I pointed out that only 15-20 percent of Minneapolis Black students score proficient in reading. Suppose we knew in Minnesota that implementing a robust plan like this would dramatically increase the number of successful students. Would we be willing to try that with a few Minnesota schools to see if it actually works? Would we be willing to pay for it? And, would teaching be a whole lot more satisfying for those who teach under that system?

5. What does it cost?

Brooke's 2019-20 annual report showed total revenue of about $47.6 million for 1,970 students, roughly $24,200 per student. That figure includes about $8.9 million in transportation and pension costs paid on Brooke's behalf. Federal finance data (NCES F-33, fiscal 2022) put Brooke's per-pupil spending at about $24,100, compared with about $20,300 for St. Cloud ISD 742. That is roughly $3,800, or 19 percent, more per student.

Three things stand out:

  • The gap is modest in dollars. Brooke is not lavishly funded compared with St. Cloud.
  • A dollar buys less in Boston. Boston is far more expensive than St. Cloud, and Brooke's budget also carries about $7 million a year in facility costs.
  • Brooke can direct its money where it believes it matters. It spends on time and on teachers: 30 percent more learning time, a paid residency, intensive coaching and built-in collaboration. It has the freedom to set its own calendar, school day and staffing, without having to bargain each change separately.

This is the point I have been making for years. Money makes a difference in education when it is used effectively. But simply sending more money to districts is unlikely to produce Brooke-like results unless the money buys the things that work, and unless districts have the authority and the vision to buy them. Minnesota must change how we deliver education and pay for it at the same time.

6. The rest of the Brooke model

Time, money and teacher development are the parts of Brooke's model that require policy change. Brooke's success also depends on what happens in the classroom:

  • Putting the thinking on students. Brooke rejects the "I do, we do, you do" lesson, in which students watch the teacher solve a problem and then imitate it. Lessons begin with an unfamiliar problem that students attack using what they already know. Then teachers lead a discussion that compares students' strategies, draws connections between them and corrects misconceptions. Mastery means applying an idea to a significantly different problem, not repeating the same one. One benefit: Brooke students don't panic when a state test presents a problem they haven't seen before.
  • Literacy taught as a love of reading. Brooke teaches phonics like any good school, but you will not find reading worksheets there. When a student struggles, teachers first ask why the student doesn't love reading, and work to unlock that love.
  • Challenged and known. Brooke's two pillars are that every student should be academically challenged and personally known by the adults in the building.
  • A culture of achievement. Brooke makes its expectation that every student will achieve explicit and celebrates it publicly. Yet it avoids the rigid, scripted "no excuses" discipline found in some high-performing charters.
  • A shared instructional system. Teachers across the network use common lesson structures, curricula and tools, so effective techniques become shared craft. Brooke publishes more than 100 classroom videos and its curricular materials on its resources site. Minnesota educators can watch them today, free.
  • English learners and students with disabilities supported inside the regular classroom. English learner coordinators, special educators and classroom teachers plan together, while students keep full access to grade-level work. English learner coordinators stay with the same students and families for years.
  • Teachers, not programs. Brooke deliberately avoids layering on intervention programs and computer-based instruction. It invests instead in the quality of classroom teaching.
  • Stable leadership. Jon Clark has led Brooke since 2002 and Kimberly Steadman since 2004. Brooke has spent two decades refining one coherent model rather than cycling through initiatives.

Can we do this here?

Some of Brooke's practices cost nothing but will and skill. Any Minnesota school could start putting the thinking on students tomorrow, and Brooke has published its materials to help. But the foundation of Brooke's success is more time for students, a serious investment in developing teachers, and protected time for teachers to learn from each other. That foundation costs money, and it requires structural change: longer school days and years, a different use of teacher time, and the authority to organize schools around what works.

Minnesota's current funding system gives districts neither the resources nor the structure to build that foundation. If we are serious about closing the gaps our schools now accept as normal, we need to design the education our students need, calculate what it costs, and fund it. Brooke shows that the results are worth it.

Saturday, November 7, 2026

Message for Governor-Elect Klobuchar: Mississippi Demonstrates that Statewide Bold Systemic Education Reform Really Works

Minnesota now has a governor-elect who has the toughness, the intellect, and legislative support to begin the hard work necessary to reform our public education system so that it works for students of color, lower income students and English language learners and, indeed all students. In our last post, we described Minnesota's anemic and powerless system for supporting struggling schools. It rests on radical local control, voluntary acceptance of help through the COMPASS network, and almost no measurement of whether that help works. The evidence that it works is thin. We wrote that of the 30 schools MDE once held up as success stories, most have since lost the gains that let them leave the state's improvement list.

In this post, we suggest that we can learn from what other states have tried. Massachusetts, Tennessee, Mississippi, California and others have tried efforts to transform individual failing schools and district. This post looks briefly at those attempts to force change in selected districts, but without statewide transformation. We argue that these efforts did not succeed, in part, because they failed to transform the entire state system. We then look at length at Mississippi, the one state that rebuilt its whole system, taking the long view, and stayed with it long enough to see results. The message to the DFL trifecta and its new leader Governor-elect Klobuchar is that genuine bold reform must occur at every level systemically. A receivership of one school is not systemic change. The entire governmental structure, MDE's leadership vision, teacher training institutions, non governmental organizations, and even organized labor, must unite around comprehensive thoughtful coordinated reform.

To illustrate this point, let's look at some efforts to target a single school or district, without state wide systemic reform.

Single school restructuring, few lasting results

Over the past fifteen years, states and districts have pulled nearly every major lever short of statewide systemic reform: state receivership of a single district, partnerships with teachers' unions in a single district, replacing staff, in a single school, longer school days in a single school, and large federal turnaround grants. A few examples:

  • Lawrence, Massachusetts (placed under state receivership, 2011). Math scores rose substantially within two years; reading barely moved. Proficiency rates remain low compared to statewide averages. For instance, roughly 17% of students in grades 3–8 met or exceeded expectations in English Language Arts (compared to a 40% state average), with math scores at similar levels.
  • Springfield, Massachusetts (Empowerment Zone, 2015). Strong early gains. The program has resulted in mixed results. A decade later, half of the zone's 16 schools had improved enough to return to district control; the other half still struggle.
  • Orchard Gardens K–8, Boston (2010). Reading proficiency nearly tripled in three years. After the principal left and the federal money ended, the school slid back toward the bottom of Massachusetts schools. According to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Orchard Gardens K-8 School is rated as requiring assistance or intervention, in need of focused/targeted support, and among the lowest performing 10% of schools.
  • Tennessee (2012). District-run Innovation Zones produced early gains, but they stalled as the program expanded, faded once students reached high school, and Memphis has since phased the zone out. The state's Achievement School District, which turned schools over to charter operators, did no better than comparable schools. See "Tennessee’s costly, disruptive school turnaround work didn’t help students long term."
  • California's School Improvement Grants (2010). There were reported large gains during the three-year grants, concentrated in schools that replaced staff. A national evaluation found no significant effect overall, and Congress ended the program in 2016, though a later study including San Francisco found the gains largely held. An American Institutes for Research evaluation of California's High Priority Schools Grant Program, the state's earlier turnaround grant program, recommended ending categorical interventions of this kind in favor of comprehensive, long-term resource and administrative support for the lowest-performing schools.
  • Holyoke and Southbridge, Massachusetts (receivership, 2015 and 2016). Same law and state agency as Lawrence. After a decade, Holyoke's graduation rate rose from 60 to 77 percent, but its test scores barely moved; it returned to local control in 2025. Southbridge has cycled through multiple state receivers, struggles to keep teachers, and remains under state control. One of the most comprehensive reviews of the state takeover strategy, by Beth Schueler and Joshua Bleiberg, looked at 35 districts, spanning 14 states, that were taken over by state authorities between 2011 and 2016. The analysis included two Massachusetts districts, Lawrence and Holyoke, that were under state control at the time. “Overall, we find no evidence that state takeover improves academic achievement,” the authors concluded.

None of these efforts was part of an overarching, statewide reform. Each targeted one district or a group of schools. Nothing in the state's larger system, its standards, tests, accountability or capacity to support teaching, was rebuilt to hold the gains in place. Let's now take a look at Mississippi's more systemic statewide approach to reform.

Mississippi: a two-decade top-to-bottom systemic marathon

In our last post we promised more on Mississippi. Its story is very different from the ones above. Mississippi did not try one bold intervention in a handful of schools. Over roughly twenty years, it rebuilt the rules for every school in the state, in a deliberate order, and held onto those changes through political storms. The emphasis was not on teacher replacement, or receiverships, but on building an infrastructure of systemic supports, effective practices and meaningful accountability.

The best account of how this happened comes from Rachel Canter, who founded Mississippi First, the state's leading education policy organization, and led it for 17 years. Her April 2026 report for the Progressive Policy Institute, Inside the Mississippi Marathon, is an insider's account, and Canter is candid that she helped write and pass many of the laws she describes. It is not an independent evaluation. But it is the most detailed explanation available of what Mississippi actually did, and it is worth reading in full.

From last to near the top

On the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the national test used to compare states, Mississippi was tied for last in reading and math when state testing began in 1992. By 2019 its fourth graders had reached the national average in both subjects, and it had substantially closed the gap in eighth grade. On average, Canter reports, Mississippi students improved about twice as fast as students nationally over two decades. After COVID, Mississippi's fourth graders recovered in reading and math while scores in much of the country kept falling.

The gains were not limited to the state's more advantaged students. Among fourth graders:

  • Black students matched their national peers in reading and math by 2017 and have outscored them since 2019.
  • Low-income students caught their national peers by 2015 and have outscored them since 2019.
  • Students with disabilities matched their peers in 2015 and outscored them in 2019 and 2024.
  • The state's weaker readers, those at the 25th percentile, beat the national average for that group in 2024.

Mississippi’s record is not uniformly strong. Its fourth-grade reading scores rose 10 points between 2013 and 2019 and have held steady since, while its eighth-grade reading scores have barely moved since 2013. But context matters. While Mississippi held steady, reading scores fell across most of the country, and the state’s eighth graders climbed from 50th to 41st in reading. Once the Urban Institute’s adjustments for poverty, race, disability and English-learner status are applied, even Mississippi’s weakest result, eighth-grade reading, ranks fourth in the nation. Adjusted scores are an estimate of how well a state teaches the students it has, not a measure of how well those students actually read, and too many Mississippi eighth graders still read below grade level. The state itself recognizes the problem: this year it added a $9 million initiative to bring reading coaches into middle and high schools. Mississippi’s lesson for Minnesota is not that it has finished the job, but that a sustained, statewide effort can move a whole system, and that the work has to continue past third grade.

Skeptics have argued that one aspect of Mississippi's state plan -- holding back weak third-grade readers -- inflates Mississippi's fourth-grade scores. Canter answers that retained students did not enter the fourth-grade test sample until 2017, after about three-quarters of the climb was complete, and that fourth graders taking the test are no older than before. Mississippi does hold back a large share of third graders, about 7 to 10 percent in recent years, but it held back many students before the reform as well, and one study attributes only about a fifth of the fourth-grade gain to retention. Th No child can be held back more than once under the law, so every student eventually reaches fourth grade and can be tested. The point here, is that Mississippi had a carefully considered statewide plan that seems to be working. Minnesota needs a bold plan that works for Minnesota, and if Minnesota can succeed without holding kids back, well great.

Not a reading law alone

Most national coverage credits Mississippi's "science of reading" law, and about 40 states have since adopted reading policies modeled on it. Canter argues that this reading of the story is badly incomplete. In her account, Mississippi's results rested on four pillars, all built around one idea, holding the whole system accountable for higher expectations:

  1. Standards, testing and accountability. Set high expectations for what students should learn in each grade, test honestly against them, and rate schools on the results.
  2. Consequences for poor performance. Give the state real power to intervene in schools and districts that keep failing. Canter argues that it is not that takeovers fixed Mississippi’s worst districts. It’s that a credible threat of consequences, combined with honest grades, gave every district a reason to take the standards, testing and reading reforms seriously.
  3. Evidence-based instruction. Adopt practices with a proven record, starting with how reading is taught.
  4. Support for implementation. Build a state department of education able to help districts do the work, especially the many small districts that could not build that capacity on their own. The cost was modest: the reading law's coaching, training and screening have run about $15 million a year since 2014, less than half a percent of the state's education budget, in a state that ranks near last in per-pupil spending.

The order mattered. Mississippi built the foundation first and turned to classroom instruction only after expectations and accountability were in place.

Building the foundation, 2004–2013

Higher standards, forced from outside. In 2004, a federal review under No Child Left Behind found Mississippi's standards and tests so weak that they did not meet federal requirements. The state raised them modestly. In 2010 it went much further, adopting the Common Core standards and joining a multistate testing group whose exams set a far higher bar for proficiency. Canter regards that step as the moment Mississippi stopped hiding mediocre learning behind high proficiency rates.

Real authority over failing districts. Mississippi had taken over troubled districts before, but mostly for financial or safety problems, and the takeovers did little for students. In 2009 the Children First Act let the state intervene in any district rated failing for two consecutive years, with student achievement at the center. Later laws widened the triggers: an F in two of three years, a D or F four years running, or more than half of a district's schools rated F.

An honest grading system. In 2012 the legislature required A-through-F grades for every school and district. MDE then rebuilt the formula behind the grades, and the legislature wrote it into law in 2013. Schools now earn credit only for students who are actually proficient, not partial credit for students below grade level. Growth means a year of learning in a year's time, with extra credit for improving the lowest-performing quarter of students. High schools get credit only for on-time, four-year graduates. Schools can predict their own grade once test results arrive.

The 2013 session. In the same month the accountability bill went to the governor, the legislature passed three more landmark laws: Mississippi's first state-funded pre-K program, which had to meet all ten national quality benchmarks; the Literacy-Based Promotion Act; and a charter school law. The pre-K and reading laws were drafted together so that children would see a consistent approach from pre-K through third grade.

The reading law, in full

The Literacy-Based Promotion Act is best known for its third-grade "gate": third graders who score at the lowest level on the state reading test must repeat the grade unless they pass a retest or qualify for a narrow exemption. When the law passed, about 14 percent of third graders scored at that level, while only about 3 percent were being held back each year. Opponents predicted retention rates near 30 percent. Legislators nonetheless gave the state only two years to prepare, and the gate took effect in 2015.

Canter stresses that legislators did not think children or teachers were simply not trying hard enough, and nobody was eager to hold children back. What won passage was the rest of the law, which built a system around early reading:

  • Screening for every child. Children take a kindergarten readiness test within 30 days of starting school, a reading screener three times a year from kindergarten through third grade, and a dyslexia screener at the end of kindergarten and start of first grade.
  • Parents told early and often. When a screener flags a problem, parents receive a state-drafted letter listing the help their child will get. The child gets a diagnostic test, an individual reading plan within two weeks, regular progress checks and a plan for reading at home.
  • Teachers trained in how reading is learned. Teacher-preparation programs must teach the science of reading, and pre-K through third-grade teachers must pass a state reading-science test, or complete a state-approved boot camp, to be licensed. Working teachers receive training from the state or their district.
  • A state-funded testing system. MDE pays for the kindergarten readiness test, screeners and diagnostics, and tracks whether every district uses them as required.
  • Direct state help in the weakest schools. In schools the state designates for literacy support, MDE chooses the curriculum and screeners, requires training for teachers and principals, and hires, trains and supervises a coach for every kindergarten through third-grade teacher.

The legislature also gave MDE $9.5 million to carry out the law, a notable sum in a tight budget year.

Separate research supports the gate's effect: students held back under the law scored substantially higher in sixth-grade reading than similar students who were promoted, though they had an extra year of school and their math scores did not change.

Who led

Mississippi's governor has limited constitutional power over schools. Authority rests mainly with the legislature and an appointed State Board of Education, which hires the state superintendent. Canter's account is therefore not a story of one governor or one superintendent but of a team.

  • Legislative leaders. After Republicans won both chambers in 2011, Lt. Gov. Tate Reeves named Sen. Gray Tollison, a former school board attorney with a deep command of education law, to chair the Senate Education Committee. Tollison carried the accountability and charter bills himself and shepherded the rest through the Senate; Speaker Philip Gunn and a group of House members carried the companion bills. The pre-K and reading laws passed with more than 80 percent of the vote in both chambers, and the accountability bill passed without a single objection.
  • The governor. Gov. Phil Bryant signaled that 2013 would be devoted to education and offered his own package. Two years later, though, he led the push to drop Common Core and the new tests, so his support was not constant.
  • The state department of education. Interim superintendent Lynn House and her chief academic officer, Kim Benton, a former turnaround principal, began implementing the new laws in 2013. Carey Wright, superintendent from late 2013, reorganized MDE around measurable goals, reported publicly each year on progress toward them, and changed the department's role from policing compliance to helping districts succeed.
  • Partners outside government. Mississippi First, the Barksdale Reading Institute, university reading experts, a handful of reform-minded superintendents, and Jeb Bush's ExcelinEd all played roles. Canter notes that Mississippi never had large philanthropic support; the work rested on relationships built over years.

Holding the line

The reforms nearly collapsed in 2015. That year the new tests and the third-grade gate took effect for the first time, every statewide office and legislative seat was on the ballot, and a national backlash against Common Core had reached Mississippi. Conservative media attacked the standards daily, district leaders warned of mass retentions, the governor campaigned to scrap the standards and tests, and legislators feared primary challenges.

Mississippi kept its standards, the third-grade gate, its accountability system and the independence of its education department. Canter describes one morning when Sen. Tollison, threatened with losing his chairmanship, refused to advance a bill that would have let a politically appointed panel rewrite the standards, and the two of them redrafted it on the spot. The state did give something up: it left the multistate testing group. But MDE quickly bought a replacement test of similar difficulty and changed the standards as little as possible.

Once the politics cooled, the work continued quietly. In 2016 the state raised the bar for passing the third-grade gate and required a reading plan for every child with identified difficulties. The reading-science licensing test for new elementary teachers took effect. School grades based on the harder tests began to carry consequences. In 2018 MDE redesigned its review of curricula so that districts would choose high-quality materials. In 2019, fourth graders reached the national average, the goal the State Board had set a decade earlier.

What Mississippi did not do

Canter emphasizes what Mississippi left out as much as what it did. It resisted chasing the latest reform idea. It did not spend its political capital on teacher evaluation, tenure or merit pay fights, and its charter sector stayed small, only six schools by 2019. It had no large foundation money and no wave of outside talent. Its gains came from policy, people and persistence, sustained across changes in party control, three governors and several superintendents.

A warning to states copying Mississippi

Many states now say they are copying Mississippi, but Canter finds that most are adopting only the comfortable parts. Professional development and coaching are popular; changes to teacher licensing are adopted about half as often. Twenty-seven states allow or require holding back third graders who cannot read, but most allow broad exemptions, such as a teacher's judgment or simply completing a reading plan, that do not ensure a child can read before fourth grade. Mississippi's exemptions are narrow, and its requirement to notify parents repeatedly, year after year, means no family is surprised when a child still cannot read at the end of third grade.

In Canter's words, "Piecemeal policy gets piecemeal results." States that adopt the reading curriculum without the standards, accountability and state capacity behind it, she warns, will be disappointed, and may wrongly conclude that the science of reading does not work.

What this means for Minnesota

Four lessons stand out.

Reform has to be systemic. School-by-school turnarounds, even successful ones, rarely last on their own. Mississippi's gains came from changing the rules for every school: expectations, testing, accountability, consequences, instruction and state support, adopted in sequence and kept in place for years. COMPASS, voluntary and aimed at individual schools, resembles the piecemeal efforts, not Mississippi. Nor is the difference money. Since 2023 Minnesota has appropriated more than $110 million in one-time funding for its READ Act, on top of about $45 million a year in literacy aid, more per student than Mississippi spends. But Minnesota distributes most of that money to every district by formula, while Mississippi spends most of its money on state coaches in its lowest-performing schools, backed by the third-grade gate, A-through-F school grades and the threat of state intervention. Minnesota's reading law has none of those.

Change has to reach the classroom. The successes changed teaching, added learning time, and put effective teachers in front of the students who needed them most. Takeovers that only changed who was in charge did not help.

Support has to be sustained. Orchard Gardens, half of Springfield's zone schools and Minnesota's own 2022 exits tell the same story: a short burst of help, followed by business as usual, fades. Mississippi's leaders stayed with their agenda through elections, a fierce political backlash and changes in leadership.

Results have to be measured. We know what Lawrence, Springfield and Tennessee's Innovation Zones achieved because someone measured it carefully, and we know Holyoke and the Achievement School District failed for the same reason. Minnesota has spent years on school support without ever measuring its effect. It cannot tell which of its efforts work, so it cannot do more of what works and stop what does not.

None of this requires Minnesota to copy another state's program. It requires the state to decide that persistent failure in a school is the state's problem, not only the district's, and to back that decision with the authority, money and staff to do something about it.

In our next post, we will look at a different kind of evidence: charter schools, in Boston and here in St. Paul, that have produced strong results for low-income students year after year, and what their practices could teach Minnesota's public schools.

Sources

Turnarounds

Mississippi

Minnesota

Monday, November 2, 2026

Minnesota’s Struggling School Support System: Dedicated People, Failing Design

In our last post (Blogspot | Substack), we compared six Minnesota public school districts and one higher-performing charter school, Higher Ground Academy. We focused on a very large difference in the reading proficiency of Black students whose demographic characteristics were comparable. Among Black students who are not English learners, 2026 reading proficiency ranged from 15.5 percent in Minneapolis to 53.4 percent at Higher Ground Academy, about 48 percent after adjusting for its low special education rate. Anoka-Hennepin, the state's largest traditional district, reached 43.1 percent.

From that data we drew a conclusion: Minnesota must do much more to make sure districts and schools get the support they need, the funding they need, and a more robust form of supportive accountability. If some schools can help these students read well, the state has an obligation to find out how, and to make sure every school serving similar students can do the same.

This is the first in a series of posts on how Minnesota might do that. We begin with the system the state has now. This is not a criticism of any one: it is a criticism of Minnesota's systemic failure meaningfully to intervene and of the states rather anemic failure to identify and report on what's not working. The fault lies with both political support for radical unaccountable local control.

Minnesota's current system: radical local control

Minnesota's approach to struggling schools rests on radical local control. The state identifies schools that are falling behind, publishes data about them, and offers help. Beyond that, decisions about curriculum, staffing, schedules, and how to respond to poor results belong to the local district. Accountability consists almost entirely of the publication of descriptive data.

Every three years, the state's North Star accountability system identifies the lowest-performing schools. In August 2025 it identified 310 of them. Identification brings a label, a requirement to write an improvement plan, and an offer of assistance. It does not bring a required change in practice, an outside review of whether the plan is working, or any consequence beyond a deeper designation if the school fails to improve.

In summary, Minnesota's system has these characteristics:

  • Identification without intervention. The state finds struggling schools reasonably well, but has no authority to intervene when a school stays at the bottom cycle after cycle.
  • Voluntary support. Help is offered, not required. Districts choose whether and how to use it.
  • Self-directed plans. The district writes its own improvement plan. No independent party approves it or checks whether it is carried out.
  • No required practices. Identified schools need not adopt any particular curriculum, instructional framework, or staffing approach.
  • Modest dedicated funding. The state's support system costs about $13 million a year and pays for regional staff, not for help delivered directly in schools.
  • No evaluation. The state has never measured whether its support improves student outcomes.

Minnesota has moved in a more directive direction in one area: the READ Act now requires evidence-based reading instruction and teacher training. But for schools identified as struggling, the basic model remains local choice backed by published data.

How COMPASS works

By all accounts, the people who staff COMPASS are dedicated professionals. Nothing in this post questions their commitment or their skill. The problem is the design of the system they work in.

COMPASS, short for Collaborative Minnesota Partnerships to Advance Student Success, is the state's system of support for school improvement. It is run by the Minnesota Department of Education together with the state's nine regional service cooperatives. Since July 2024, each cooperative has had a regional COMPASS team, created under a Joint Powers Agreement with the department. The COMPASS team work with the limited resources and limited, should I say, non-existent authority provided by the legislature.

State-level teams develop professional learning "pathways" in areas such as literacy, math, attendance, classroom instruction, and school improvement. Regional teams help districts analyze their data, choose pathways, and get coaching and technical assistance. Support comes in three levels: universal help open to every district, customized help for schools showing early warning signs, and intensive help for schools identified under North Star.

That is the system on paper. In practice it is failing the students it exists to serve, for these reasons:

  • It is optional. The state's own description calls COMPASS an "opportunity," accessed according to "local needs and capacity." A district can serve its identified schools itself instead. Minneapolis, I understand, relies mainly on its own school improvement staff and uses COMPASS only selectively.
  • It changes nothing it is not invited to change. COMPASS cannot require a school to adopt a curriculum, alter its schedule, or change how it assigns teachers, even if what it is doing is not working.
  • It works mostly through courses and consultation. The research favors coaching inside classrooms, frequent observation, and feedback, not professional learning modules. (ie., a coach working inside a teacher’s classroom, observing frequently and giving immediate feedback on actual lessons)
  • It has no outside check. No independent party reviews whether a school's plan is sound or whether it is being carried out.
  • It has no consequences. A school that does not improve receives more of the same help.
  • It is not measured. After years of operation under COMPASS and its predecessor, the state cannot say whether any of it works.

The critique

The results

Based on the data that I can find, it appears that few schools leave the bottom. Of the schools North Star identified in 2018, only 30 met the state's standard for exit by 2022. Sixty-four others avoided re-identification but missed at least one of their improvement targets, so they continued to receive support. The same schools appear on the list cycle after cycle.

Outcomes in the largest district have stalled. From 2022 through 2026, math proficiency among Black students in Minneapolis stayed essentially flat at about 8.3 percent, reaching 9.5 percent in only one year. Because the math test (MCA-III) did not change during that period, the results are directly comparable from year to year. Fewer than one in ten Black students in the state's largest city are proficient in math, and nothing in five years of data suggests that is changing.

The state's own plan for measuring COMPASS will not tell us whether it works. Through June 2027, COMPASS will measure participant satisfaction surveys, evidence of engagement, and districts' self-evaluations. Through June 2029, it adds knowledge and skill gains, case studies, and interviews. Student outcomes will be tracked only for districts that choose to engage, with no comparison group and no date attached.

The Best Practices reports

Since 2012, state law (Minn. Stat. 120B.35, subd. 4) has required the education commissioner to report annually on the best practices used in Minnesota's high-performing schools. This is the one place where the state is required to study what works. The reports show how little the state has learned.

They report improvements without validating the reason for improvement. Each report describes schools that did well in some area and asks what they did. None compares them with similar schools that did not improve, so none can show that the practices made a difference. Every report says so itself: a conclusive causal link between the practices and student performance cannot be made.

The reporting method changes almost every year. The reports have surveyed "high growth" schools, then "reward" schools, then schools recognized under North Star, then schools that held up through the pandemic, then schools that exited identification, then rankings of high-achieving schools, then graduation rates. In FY2018 there were no high-performing schools to study at all. No year's findings can be compared with another's.

The evidence is thin. In FY2017, only 36 percent of surveyed schools responded. In FY2022, the department interviewed leaders at 19 of 32 schools. These are informal accounts from the schools themselves.

The findings are too general to act on. The FY2023 report examined the 30 schools that exited identification. It found three themes: evidence-based practices, targeted support, and relationships. It also found that no single practice was particularly common. A legislator reading it learns that successful schools do good things, but not which things or how to replicate them.

The state spends almost nothing on them. The department estimated the FY2017 report cost about $609 to prepare, and the FY2021 report about $1,750. That is what Minnesota invests in its only statutory inquiry into what makes schools succeed.

The reports' authors did what the statute asked with the resources they had. The failure is in what the Legislature asked for: a description of success, rather than a measurement of what causes it.

What defenders of the current system would say

Supporters of the current approach make serious arguments. Local control respects the knowledge of educators and communities closest to students. Mandates imposed from St. Paul can produce compliance rather than real change. COMPASS's regional structure is only two years old, and fair judgment of its effects may take longer. Some Minnesota schools have improved under the current system, and several are named in the Best Practices reports.

Those arguments deserve an answer, and the next posts try to give one. But none of them explains why, after nearly a decade of North Star, the state still cannot tell whether its support system works, or why so many of the same schools remain at the bottom.

Next: what other states have tried

Minnesota is not the first state to face this problem. Massachusetts, Tennessee, Mississippi, and others have tried more demanding approaches: binding turnaround plans, outside review, intensive coaching inside schools, early-literacy guarantees, and state authority to change what is not working. Some succeeded, some failed, and the differences between them are instructive. Unlike Minnesota, several measured their results carefully, so we know what they achieved.

Mississippi is a case in point. Rachel Canter, who led Mississippi's leading education reform organization for 17 years, argues that states copying Mississippi's reading law miss the point: its gains rested equally on rigorous accountability, real consequences for persistent failure, and a state agency with the capacity to support districts that lacked their own.

We will have more to say about the experience of Mississippi and other states in a subsequent post.

Sources

Saturday, October 31, 2026

2026 MCA-IV Results Demonstrate that Minnesota Needs to Implement Robust Systemic Supportive Reforms

Gerald W. Von Korff · October 31, 2026

Each year, the state of Minnesota publishes the “Minnesota Report Card” showing the proficiency rates of students at each traditional public and charter school. The report shows results for all students, and for students with various demographic characteristics, such as race, status as an English language learner, special education, lower income and homelessness. The theory behind the Report Card is that transparency and public pressure will cause the school districts with lower proficiency rates to take aggressive action. The Minnesota Report Card has existed in some form since 2014: the evidence demonstrates that transparency alone does not do the job.

This memorandum compares the proficiency rates of Black students in six Minnesota school districts and one exceptional charter school, Higher Ground Academy. The purpose is not to identify so-called good school districts and bad school districts, but rather to demonstrate, by comparing students with similar demographics, that better results are possible. The solution is not transparency alone, because that is not working. The solution is a combination of adequate funding, accountability for spending that funding on effective practices, and a robust state system of supportive non-punitive accountability.

SUMMARY

To illustrate the fact that implementing tactics to realize student potential can make a significant difference, we’ve focused on Minnesota Black students, because they are the largest non-white demographic. We have extracted from this group English language learners, so that the proficiency rates are not distorted by lack of full command of the English language. The data starkly illustrates a significant difference among the selected districts. Our purpose is to argue that we can do better, and that the state should be mobilizing a system of supportive accountability so that we are realizing the potential of these students.

Among Black students who are not English learners (non-EL), 2026 reading proficiency ranges from 15.5% in Minneapolis to 53.4% at Higher Ground Academy (HGA). That is more than a threefold difference across seven districts and charters. Adjusted for HGA’s very low special education rate, HGA’s figure would be about 48%, still the highest of the seven.

RankDistrictBlack non-EL % proficientFree/reduced-price meals
1Higher Ground Academy (charter)53.4%*69.8%
2Anoka-Hennepin43.1%36.6%
3Osseo30.5%43.0%
4St. Cloud27.2%66.7%
5Hopkins20.0%37.0%
6St. Paul19.0%64.5%
7Minneapolis15.5%53.6%

* About 48% after adjusting for HGA’s low special education rate. See “Special Education Adjustment for HGA.”

Three findings stand out:

  • Strong results are not only a charter phenomenon. Anoka-Hennepin, the state's largest traditional district, reaches 43.1% for Black non-EL students, second only to HGA. Yes, there may be other factors explaining these differences. This is not about blaming or finding an alibi: it’s about figuring out what needs to be done to address the needs of all students.
  • The two central-city districts are at the bottom, with the widest gaps. St. Paul and Minneapolis have the highest White proficiency of the seven (69.1% and 74.2%) and the lowest Black non-EL proficiency. Their gaps between White and Black non-EL students are 50 and 59 points.
  • Poverty matters but does not decide the outcome. Hopkins and Anoka-Hennepin have nearly identical poverty rates (37%) yet differ by 23 points. HGA and St. Cloud, two of the poorest, outperform four districts with less poverty.

The memo closes with three themes about how this information should be used: to learn from districts that do better and to identify districts that need more support; to recognize that publishing scores has not, by itself, produced improvement; and to build the system of supportive accountability that the Minnesota Constitution requires.

DEMOGRAPHICS AT A GLANCE

The seven differ widely in size, racial makeup and need. Figures are October 1, 2025 enrollment, all grades.

Race and ethnicity (% of enrollment)

DistrictEnrollmentWhiteBlackHispanicAsianAmerican IndianTwo or more
Anoka-Hennepin38,33653.517.67.411.63.26.6
St. Paul32,75022.424.114.527.63.57.9
Minneapolis30,07936.426.822.03.15.85.9
Osseo21,38536.327.810.415.82.37.5
St. Cloud10,23233.843.012.12.41.17.2
Hopkins7,07148.725.212.13.61.98.4
Higher Ground Academy1,1777.489.10.13.40.00.0

Other characteristics (% of enrollment)

DistrictFree/reduced-price mealsEnglish learnersSpecial educationHomeless
Anoka-Hennepin36.610.020.31.1
St. Paul64.530.320.61.9
Minneapolis53.621.919.15.5
Osseo43.012.016.51.4
St. Cloud66.723.524.92.0
Hopkins37.09.619.70.9
Higher Ground Academy69.851.52.10.0

The English-learner share of Black test-takers also varies: about 43–44% in St. Cloud and at HGA, 21% in St. Paul, and 12–15% in the other four. This difference warns that it is a mistake to compare Black proficiency rates without disaggregation.

COMPARISON

Chart

Source: Proficiency: Minnesota Report Card, 2026 Reading MCA-IV (Reading.xlsx). FRP: MDE enrollment file, October 1, 2025. HGA is shown before the special education adjustment.

In every district, removing English learners raises the Black rate, but by different amounts: 10 points in St. Cloud and 15 at HGA, where many Black students are English learners, and 2–4 points elsewhere.

TRENDS NOW VISIBLE

With seven districts, several patterns appear that four could not show. With this few districts they are suggestive, not statistically established.

Chart

Source: Minnesota Report Card, 2026 Reading MCA-IV (Reading.xlsx); FRP from MDE enrollment file, October 1, 2025. Gap = White minus Black non-EL, in points.

  1. High White results do not necessarily carry Black students along. Minneapolis and St. Paul have the best White results and the worst Black non-EL results. Across the six districts, the White–Black non-EL gap rises almost in step with White proficiency (correlation 0.86). Anoka-Hennepin and St. Cloud have the smallest gaps, 16 and 22 points.
  2. Poverty is only loosely related to the district differences. Across the six districts, the correlation between poverty and Black non-EL proficiency is about −0.45, and the outliers run both ways. Hopkins and Anoka-Hennepin have the same 37% poverty rate and are 23 points apart. St. Cloud has more poverty than Osseo, Hopkins or Minneapolis but scores above Hopkins and Minneapolis.
  3. In three districts, there are very high rates of Black non-EL students scoring at the lowest level (Beginning). The share at Beginning is 63% in Minneapolis, 62% in St. Paul and 56% in Hopkins, against 29% in Anoka-Hennepin and 19% at HGA.
  4. Black English learners do poorly almost everywhere, with two exceptions. They are 4–7% proficient in five districts. Anoka-Hennepin reaches 12.8% and HGA 19.1%, the same two systems that lead for Black non-EL students.
  5. Minneapolis has the highest homelessness rate (5.5%) and the lowest Black result. Homelessness, like poverty, may play a role.

ANOKA-HENNEPIN (ISD 11)

Black non-EL students are 43.1% proficient, the best result among traditional districts and only 16 points behind White students in the district. Just 28.6% score at the Beginning level.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students18,92650.6%24.5%
White10,24959.2%18.5%
Black, all3,21638.7%33.9%
Black, not EL2,74143.1%28.6%
Black EL (derived)47512.8%64.6%

The state's largest district: 38,336 students, 53.5% White and 17.6% Black, with 36.6% free/reduced-price meals, 10.0% English learners, 20.3% special education and 1.1% homeless. Its Black students make up a smaller share of enrollment than in most of the others, and its poverty is among the lowest. Even so, Hopkins has the same poverty rate and gets far lower results. Again, the goal is not to blame, but to recognize that some districts need more support (and more accountability measures) than others.

OSSEO (ISD 279)

Black non-EL students are 30.5% proficient, third of the seven, and 34 points behind White students (64.4%).

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students10,25344.3%31.3%
White3,84464.4%14.2%
Black, all2,73827.6%47.1%
Black, not EL2,40330.5%43.7%
Black EL (derived)3356.9%71.3%

An inner-ring suburban district of 21,385 students: 36.3% White, 27.8% Black and 15.8% Asian, with 43.0% free/reduced-price meals, 12.0% English learners, 16.5% special education and 1.4% homeless. Only 12% of its Black test-takers are English learners, the lowest share of the seven.

ST. CLOUD (ISD 742)

Black non-EL students are 27.2% proficient, fourth of the seven, and 22 points behind White students (48.9%), the second-smallest gap.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students4,31530.5%47.3%
White1,44748.9%27.9%
Black, all1,77817.5%60.8%
Black, not EL1,02127.2%47.1%
Black EL (derived)7574.4%79.3%

It has 10,232 students: 43.0% Black and 33.8% White, with 66.7% free/reduced-price meals, 23.5% English learners, 24.9% special education and 2.0% homeless. St. Cloud has the highest special education rate of the seven and the second-highest poverty rate. About 43% of its Black test-takers are English learners, so its all-Black figure (17.5%) understates how its Black non-EL students are doing. Its gap is small partly because its White students score lower than White students in the other districts.

HOPKINS (ISD 270)

Black non-EL students are 20.0% proficient, fifth of the seven, despite one of the lowest poverty rates. White students are 64.2% proficient, a gap of 44 points.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students3,22245.8%33.2%
White1,64164.2%16.7%
Black, all71718.0%59.0%
Black, not EL61020.0%55.9%
Black EL (derived)1076.5%76.6%

Hopkins has 7,071 students: 48.7% White and 25.2% Black, with 37.0% free/reduced-price meals, 9.6% English learners, 19.7% special education and 0.9% homeless. Hopkins is the clearest case against a poverty-only explanation: it has the same poverty rate as Anoka-Hennepin and less than half its Black non-EL proficiency.

ST. PAUL (ISD 625)

Black non-EL students are 19.0% proficient, sixth of the seven. White students are 69.1% proficient, a gap of 50 points.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students14,16533.5%45.8%
White3,25169.1%15.3%
Black, all3,23416.5%65.0%
Black, not EL2,54319.0%61.5%
Black EL (derived)6917.1%78.0%

St. Paul has 32,750 students: 27.6% Asian, 24.1% Black, 22.4% White and 14.5% Hispanic, with 64.5% free/reduced-price meals, 30.3% English learners (the highest of the six districts), 20.6% special education and 1.9% homeless. About 21% of its Black test-takers are English learners.

MINNEAPOLIS (SSD 1)

Black non-EL students are 15.5% proficient, the lowest of the seven. White students are 74.2% proficient, the highest White result, which makes Minneapolis's 59-point gap the widest.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students13,12941.3%42.7%
White5,19674.2%11.6%
Black, all3,14813.9%66.2%
Black, not EL2,66515.5%63.4%
Black EL (derived)4834.8%81.8%

Minneapolis has 30,079 students: 36.4% White, 26.8% Black, 22.0% Hispanic and 5.8% American Indian, with 53.6% free/reduced-price meals, 21.9% English learners, 19.1% special education and 5.5% homeless, the highest homelessness rate of the seven. Only 15% of its Black test-takers are English learners, so English learners do not explain its results. Its district-wide poverty rate is mid-range, though that average hides large differences between its schools.

HIGHER GROUND ACADEMY (CHARTER 4027)

Black non-EL students are 53.4% proficient, the best of the seven. Adjusted for HGA’s low special education rate, the figure would be about 48%, still the best (see below). Only 18.5% score at the Beginning level.

Student groupTested% proficient% Beginning
All students61836.6%35.6%
Black, all58138.2%32.5%
Black, not EL32453.4%18.5%
Black EL (derived)25719.1%50.2%
White296.9%86.2%

HGA has 1,177 students: 89.1% Black, 7.4% White and 3.4% Asian, with 69.8% free/reduced-price meals (the highest of the seven), 51.5% English learners, 2.1% special education and no homeless students reported. About 44% of its Black test-takers are English learners, and even they are 19.1% proficient. Two cautions:

  • Special education. HGA’s 2.1% rate is far below the districts’ 16–25%. Students with disabilities usually score lower. Adjusting for this lowers HGA’s Black non-EL rate by an estimated 5 points, to about 48%.
  • White students. Only 29 were tested. They may be East African or Middle Eastern students whom federal categories classify as White, but the number is too small to interpret.

SPECIAL EDUCATION ADJUSTMENT FOR HGA

HGA’s special education rate (2.1%) is far below the other six (16.5–24.9%). Because students in special education usually score lower, part of HGA’s Black non-EL result may reflect having fewer of them. Statewide figures for Black students allow a rough estimate of how much.

Black students statewideTestedProficient% proficient
All Black students50,79114,61328.8%
Not in special education42,94613,98232.6%
In special education (derived)7,8456318.0%
Not EL (for reference)39,11913,29634.0%

Source: Minnesota Report Card, 2026 Reading MCA-IV, statewide (Reading.xlsx). Special education row derived by subtracting the not-special-education counts from the all-Black counts.

Statewide, 15.4% of Black MCA test-takers are in special education, and they score about 25 points below other Black students. Proficiency for Black students who are neither English learners nor in special education is not published. The estimate therefore assumes HGA’s Black non-EL test-takers have its school-wide special education rate (2.1%) and asks what HGA’s result would be if 15.4% of them were in special education instead. The answer depends on how HGA’s special education students would score:

  • At the statewide Black special education rate (8.0%): HGA would be 47.2%, a reduction of 6.2 points. This assumes HGA adds nothing for these students.
  • In the same proportion to other students as statewide (about one-quarter of HGA’s level, or 13%): HGA would be 48.0%, a reduction of 5.4 points. This is the central estimate.
  • Twenty-five points below HGA’s other students, the statewide gap (about 29%): HGA would be 50.1%, a reduction of 3.3 points.

Using a 12% or 20% special education share instead of 15.4% moves the reduction to between about 2 and 8 points. This memo uses about 5 points, which puts HGA’s Black non-EL rate at about 48%. HGA’s lead over Anoka-Hennepin narrows from 10 points to about 5.

Even adjusted, HGA’s result is high, especially for a school where 69.8% of students qualify for free or reduced-price meals, the highest rate of the seven. About 48% is 14 points above Black non-EL students statewide (34.0%), 21 and 29 points above St. Cloud and St. Paul, whose poverty rates are nearly as high, and about equal to the statewide rate for all students (48.2%).

Several cautions apply:

  • Alternate test. Students with the most significant disabilities take the MTAS and are not counted in MCA results. That is why the 15.4% test-taker share is below district enrollment rates, and why the estimate uses the test-taker share.
  • Identification. If HGA identifies fewer students rather than enrolling fewer students with disabilities, its unidentified students are already in its 53.4%, and the true adjustment is smaller.
  • Other districts. The other six are not adjusted. Their special education rates are close enough to typical that the change would be small; St. Cloud, at 24.9%, would gain a point or two.

CONCLUSIONS

  1. Language acquisition does not completely explain differences. Removing English learners raises Black proficiency everywhere, but the ranking barely changes and the spread between districts stays at 38 points (33 with HGA adjusted).
  2. Neither poverty nor charter status completely explains differences. The two best results come from a high-poverty charter (HGA) and a low-poverty traditional district (Anoka-Hennepin). Hopkins, with Anoka-Hennepin's poverty rate, is near the bottom.
  3. What districts do appears to matter a great deal. Black non-EL students with broadly similar circumstances reach 43–48% proficiency in two systems (HGA adjusted for special education) and 15–20% in three others. That supports a multi-lever reform agenda focused on instruction, curriculum, time and expectations, not desegregation or funding alone.
  4. The central cities exhibit relatively high White proficiency rates. Minneapolis and St. Paul serve White students very well and Black non-EL students worst of all. That points to how those districts serve Black students, not to an overall lack of capacity.
  5. HGA remains a strong example, with caveats. Adjusting for its low special education rate lowers its Black non-EL result by about 5 points, to about 48%. That is still the best of the seven and high for a school where 70% of students are low-income. Charter self-selection may account for part of the remaining advantage. Anoka-Hennepin’s result shows that strong outcomes for Black students are achievable in a large traditional district.

WHAT THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE USED FOR

Beyond the findings above, these comparisons raise three broader themes.

  1. The statistics answer two questions: First, they identify districts that seem to be doing better with students who come to school with educational disadvantages, such as Anoka-Hennepin and HGA here. We can then ask what those districts are doing that works. Even those districts may not be reaching their full potential, but they point to the conclusion that there is potential to do better. Second, they identify districts whose students need additional support and additional resources, such as Minneapolis, St. Paul and Hopkins. Both uses look forward. Neither treats the numbers as a final grade.
  2. Transparency has not produced adequate improvement. The theory behind publishing proficiency scores is that transparency is an engine of improvement: once parents, voters and school boards see the results, districts will change. That theory is not validated. Minnesota has published proficiency results by district and student group for years, and differences like those in this memo have remained persistently the same.
  3. These results should trigger systemic, supportive accountability. The better results in some districts suggest that most Minnesota districts can do better with students who come to school with educational disadvantages. There must therefore be a system that provides districts the resources to improve dramatically what they are doing. Identifying a district’s results as inadequate should begin a process of support, not end with a published score.

This is a constitutional obligation, not only a policy choice. Article XIII, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution makes it “the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools” and to “make such provisions by taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools throughout the state.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right to an adequate education, Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993), and has held that claims that the State is failing to provide one can be decided by the courts, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018). The constitution does not provide merely for a system to expose what we are not doing. It demands that the legislature and the governor take action to provide students with an adequate education that meets state standards.

Would more districts be worth collecting? Yes. These seven cover about 31% of Black test-takers statewide. Collecting this data is time-consuming because the Minnesota report card does not make collecting comparative data easy. Other groups deserve a similar analysis.

DATA AND SOURCES

  • Proficiency: Minnesota Report Card, 2026 Reading MCA-IV, all grades, downloaded by Gerald Von Korff (Reading.xlsx). Percent proficient = Meets + Advanced.
  • Black EL (derived): computed by subtracting the Black non-EL counts from the all-Black counts. These numbers are derived from the Report Card.
  • Demographics: MDE enrollment public file 2026 (October 1, 2025 counts), district level, all grades. These are the same figures the Report Card shows on its demographics pages.
  • Correlations: calculated across the six traditional districts; HGA is excluded because it has too few White students. With six data points they show direction, not statistical significance.
  • Difference from MDE's assessment file: Report Card counts run slightly below MDE's Data Center file. For example, Minneapolis Black students are 3,148 tested and 13.9% proficient on the Report Card, against 3,213 and 15.7% in the Data Center file. The Report Card probably shows the accountability population by default. The same setting should be used for every district collected.
  • Special education adjustment: statewide 2026 Reading MCA-IV results for all Black students, Black students not in special education and Black non-EL students (Reading.xlsx, State sheet); special education figures derived by subtraction. HGA’s 2.1% special education rate is from the enrollment file (all students). The estimate is approximate; see that section for assumptions.

What Minnesota Can Learn from a High Performing School

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