On December 13, the Supreme Court delivered its second decision in the years-long Cruz-Guzman case. In the seminal 1993 Skeen v State case, the Minnesota Supreme Court established 2 important foundational principles under Minnesota's constitutional education clause. (For more on Skeen Click here) (1) That our education clause establishes a fundamental right enforceable in the courts to an adequate education that meets all state standards. (2) That the education and uniformity clauses do not demand that each school district receive the same amount of funding. Rather they require that the legislature provide school districts enough funding to afford each student with an adequate education that meets all state standards. Districts serving students with higher learning challenges must receive more and adequate funding. Unfortunately, the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs and their attorneys attempted to convert the Cruz-Guzman case into a modern form of Brown v Board of Education, in which Minnesota would be required to make sure that racially imbalanced public schools were unconstitutional without proof that racially imbalanced students deprive students of an adequate education. This may be a worthy objective: but the core purpose of the Education clause, as interpreted by our Supreme Court is to provide students with an adequate education.
In Skeen, the Supreme Court correctly recognized that the purpose of public education was to deliver an adequate education to all students. The authors of our constitution included a mandate to provide a uniform
thorough and efficient system of public education to all students, including the descendants of slaves, immigrants and
English language learners. They believed that education was the
"balance wheel of the social machinery," essential to our democratic
tradition. The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs refocused the courts' attention off of educational adequacy, off of adequate funding, and onto racial balance. Skeen was a funding case sought to assure adequate education for at least some of Minnesota students. Cruz-Guzman became an integration case. Yet while allowing the Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs to proceed, the Court itself, in Cruz-Guzman I itself reminded us of the education clause's essential purpose.
Justice Hudson explained the Skeen decision as follows:
[In Skeen, we specifically stated that “there is a fundamental right, under the Education Clause, to a ‘general and uniform system of education’ which provides an adequate education to all students in Minnesota.” We declared that the Education Clause requires the state to provide enough funds to ensure that each student receives an adequate education We declared that the Education Clause requires the state to provide enough funds to ensure that each student receives an adequate education ….an adequate level of education which meets all state standards,. “This "all state standards" was used by the Supreme Court intentionally and with a specific meaning in mind. You can read about why the Skeen Court used that language by clicking here and also by clicking here. The standards that the Supreme Court had in mind were proficiency based learning standards that would be established in accordance with state law, regulation, and policy.
But in the lower courts, these fundamental principles lost their way. Neither side, not the plaintiffs, and surely not the Attorney General, were interested in the true meaning of Skeen: the right to enough funding to afford each student with an adequate education that meets all state standards. Instead, the litigation centered around whether the education clause could be used for important social engineering: to create a more integrated society. But Cruz-Guzman II is pointing the way back to Skeen and the education clause's true purpose, to assure that students receive a truly adequate education.
Cruz-Guzman II stands for several propositions, and we'll post about this more in the future:
- The Court reaffirmed Skeen's decision that the constitution provides a fundamental enforceable right.
- However, that right is founded in an adequate education. Cruz-Guzman II does not decide what an adequate education is: the answer to that question is found, explicitly in Skeen and Cruz-Guzman I. The reason is that neither party before the Cruz-Guzman II was advocating for the adequate education demanded by the prior two decisions.
- To establish a practice is a constitutional violation, plaintiffs need not proved that the challenged practice is wholly responsible for denial of an adequate education, but merely that it is a substantial contributing factor in denying that right.
The Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs themselves, and other advocates for the constitutional right would do well to take heed: The education clause is specifically about funding and adequate education. If properly enforced, plaintiffs will now demand that the state provide enough funding to districts serving students of color, lower income students and emerging multilingual students-- enough funding to afford them with an adequate education that meets state standards, and will also assure that adequate funding is used efficiently and effectively for those students.
